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PLANNING FOR SPONTANEITY: THE
CREATION OF FREE MARKETS IN
EASTERN EUROPE
Philip R. Lochner, Jr.*
I would like to speak to you today about the prospects for
capital and securities markets in Central and Eastern Europe. I
approach this subject with not a little humility since my travels
in Central and Eastern Europe have been episodic at best, since
I am hardly an expert on their affairs, and since the political and
economic situation there seems to change daily. So what I offer
today are not final conclusions but, perhaps, something more
like preliminary notes. Let me also note at the outset that
though I will refer to Central and Eastern Europe in a unitary
fashion, there are, of course, vast differences between countries
in those regions. What I have to say, accordingly, applies more
or less to each country.
I would like to approach my subject, at least at the start,
from what may be thought to be an odd perspective: I would
initially like to look at Central and Eastern Europe by recalling
some events in Africa of thirty or forty years ago. When the re-
maining European colonial regimes in Africa collapsed in the
1950s and 1960s, the newly independent African states adopted
economic policies by which, they hoped, their economies could
be made to grow and flourish. By and large, in adopting eco-
nomic policies, they chose state central planning as their model,
whatever more felicitous name they may have given it. This
should have been no great surprise to any observer.
First, in what were at that time referred to as the under, or
undeveloped nations, African intellectual elites had been taught
the socialist and central planning economic theories then fash-
ionable in many European universities, where properly educated
young men and women learned that commerce was a bit un-
seemly, and that the market economy was an illusion. In that
academic tradition, the Soviet Union, China and socialism were
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the future - the best hope of all people.
Second, the African choice of an economic model was deter-
mined in some large part by an almost inevitable, and under-
standable, reaction against the formal ideology of the ruling co-
lonial powers. The fact that capitalism was the orthodoxy of the
colonial powers, and that central planning had been adopted by
the communist powers which supported Africa's escape from co-
lonial rule, provided a compelling sense of legitimacy to central
planning as an economic model.
We know with the benefit of hindsight that, on the whole,
African central planning failed. Socialism and central planning
were largely alien to the realities of African life and their at-
tempted implementation resulted in many cases in little more
than endemic corruption, seemingly limitless poverty, wasted
lives and, ultimately, in not a few cases, brutality and bloodshed.
There is a certain temptation among devotees of the free
market to take a measure of self-satisfaction from this unhappy
story. But too much misery developed in post-colonial Africa for
anyone to be pleased with its history over the last thirty years.
Well, what has all this to do with Central and Eastern Eu-
rope? Aren't Central and Eastern Europe - which for conve-
nience I will refer to here just as Eastern Europe; what in Cold
War days we referred to as the "satellites," stretching from Bul-
garia, Albania and Yugoslavia in the south to Poland and the
Baltic republics of the Soviet Union in the north - very differ-
ent from Africa? The answer, of course, is that in many respects
Eastern Europe is vastly different. Unlike Africa, to take only
two matters - though two very important matters - Eastern
Europe is nearly universally literate and, by world standards,
relatively rich.
Let me for the moment postpone answering my own ques-
tion -what has the African experience to do with Eastern Eu-
rope - and instead offer you some brief scenes I witnessed dur-
ing a trip to Eastern Europe not too long ago. One day I, among
others, attended a meeting in one country with representatives
of a Ministry whose task it was, supposedly, to privatize state
owned enterprises. We discussed how these civil servants ex-
pected to proceed with this task.
First, they said, they would hire western experts to value
each state enterprise. Then they would need to decide whether
each enterprise should be privatized: some enterprises which
they viewed as vital to the nation's interests .= such as utilities
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- might not be privatized at all. After categorizing enterprises,
each enterprise to be privatized would have to be converted into
corporate form so that shares could be issued. Then each enter-
prise would have to be examined and specific decisions made for
its privatization. Was the enterprise "too big" and thus likely to
become a monopoly? If it was too big it would have to be broken
up before privatization. Was the enterprise "too small" and un-
likely to be able to survive on its own? If it was, it would have to
be combined with another enterprise. Did it make sense for a
tractor factory and a tractor tire factory to be in the same corpo-
rate entity, or should they be separate corporations? Next, each
enterprise to be privatized would have to have its balance sheet
restructured: debts to the state would have to be converted to
equity or cancelled or given commercial loan terms; receivables
from and payables to other state enterprises would have to be
written off or made current. Finally, the Ministry would offer
each enterprise for sale to workers at the enterprise, and to the
public generally. The hope and expectation was that all citizens
would be roughly equal investors in all enterprises, except that
some shares of some enterprises would be sold to foreigners -
though not too many shares and the amounts might differ from
enterprise to enterprise, depending on the nature of its business.
We asked how many enterprises there were to be privatized,
after subjecting each of them to this long and rigorous process.
We were told that there were about 20,000.
On another day in another country I, along with some
others, visited with members of the national legislature. We
asked what concerned them about privatization. One legislator
said how many regulations would be needed: regulations cover-
ing how companies keep accounts; regulations covering the crea-
tion and enforceability of contracts; regulations governing the
welfare of employees; securities regulations; capital markets reg-
ulations; foreign currency regulations; laws creating relationships
among shareholders; laws creating relationships between boards
of directors and shareholders; laws relating to insider trading;
laws relating to disclosure; laws relating to brokers and their
customers; laws relating to net capital requirements; laws relat-
ing to clearance and settlement; and laws relating to taxes.
Nothing can be done, one legislator said, without first having
laws and regulations in place.
On another day I attended a meeting in another country
with a senior state banking official, who had for years led one of
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several state banks this particular country had created during its
forty-five years of communist rule. We asked him about his
plans for the future, what he wanted to accomplish. He had been
at the bank for more than two decades and he spoke proudly of
the operations of his bank throughout the country. He was sure
his bank could prosper in the market economy, and he was look-
ing forward to continuing at the bank when it was privately
owned. He showed us architects' drawings of the fine new head-
quarters he intended to build.
On another day, in another country, in another Ministry
conference room, I listened to a government official discuss plans
for a stock exchange. He believed there ought to be only one
exchange in his country to which all orders should flow so that
there would be liquidity and centralized market information. He
thought no off-floor trading should be permitted. Commodities
and currency could be traded centrally too, and no longer on
street corners. He said this - referring to the trading of cur-
rency on the streets - with a tone which suggested that trading
currency on the streets was not quite dignified.
What do these little scenes, these brief encounters with
Eastern Europe indicate? One thing they suggest, at least to me,
concerns one of the risks to the development of free markets in
Eastern Europe. The risk can be characterized as the hasty ap-
plication of the legal superstructures and assumptions of devel-
oped, western, free market economies to countries without fully
functioning markets and with a history and a tradition of cen-
trally planned economies. Commentators sometimes speak of
Eastern Europe as having a heritage of capitalism which the
Communists tried to expunge, and which is now free to re-
emerge. It is true that in some Eastern European countries there
is some history of a market economy - in Czechoslovakia, for
example. And it is true that there is a tradition of small shop-
keepers and small farmers in much of Eastern Europe. But
though all Eastern European countries may have experienced
some industrialization, some were in essence until very recently
- and may still be in some part - peasant societies,
Even where entrepreneurs once existed in Eastern Europe,
they were rarely at the center of the society or the government,
and there was little overall societal commitment to market econ-
omies. The landed aristocracy which provided much of the East
European leadership, both politically and culturally, until the
end of World War I - and later in some cases - in many in-
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stances seemed to view those engaged in commerce as greedy
and grasping and not much more than a useful evil.
Even where the market economy existed in Eastern Europe
before World War II, few people are left who had any actual
experience with it. Let's suppose at the time World War II
swept away the past, you were twenty years of age, you had had
some exposure to free markets, and you were a citizen of Czech-
oslovakia or Poland. That would mean you would now be sev-
enty years old. Your children and your grandchildren would
have known or experienced virtually nothing but statist rhetoric
and central planning.
Not only is there not much common cultural heritage of free
markets to draw on in Eastern Europe, but in many cases the
statist, centralizing impulse predates even a passing experience
with any briefly nascent capitalism. One governmental official
with whom I spoke said, in frustration, that his country had a
centuries old tradition of bureaucracy which was the heritage of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on which the forty-five years of
communist bureaucracy were a mere veneer.
It seems to me that a key risk to the development of mar-
kets, including securities markets, in Eastern Europe is that
Eastern Europe will try to impose capitalism from the top down,
rather than letting it grow from the bottom up.
The government that seeks to privatize 20,000 enterprises
has a thorough plan for doing so, but it is one which may take
years, if not decades, to execute and may require an enormous
bureaucracy to complete. Is it likely that the bureaucracy will
"wither away" if it ever completes its task? The 20,000 enter-
prises may not survive a prolonged privatization process and, at
the least, the human and economic capital in such enterprises
will be at risk during a highly uncertain transition period. There
is a possibility that, in the interim, being neither capitalist nor
socialist, the enterprises may simply shrivel and disappear. And
is it realistic to expect all citizens to end up as equal owners of
all privatized enterprises? That hope may reflect socialist, rather
than free market, sentiments and economics.
The legislator who listed the laws that needed to be adopted
before the market could be permitted to function contemplates
years of legislative paperwork in shifting political seas. But isn't
it just as plausible that laws could follow the markets and reflect
the unique conditions of their growth and development, rather
than precede them?
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The high official of the state bank who has served in that
capacity for much of his adult life contemplates a future much
like the past, except for a new headquarters building from which
all decisions will be made. Is that thinking more reflective of
market competition or socialism?
The official who believes all securities trading should be or-
ganized by the state in the state-sponsored market is engaging in
state planning for free markets. But is it just as plausible that a
market economy could grow faster and more vigorously from the
street, from outside state-fixed boundaries, if only permitted to
do so?
In one Eastern European country, the new stock exchange is
planned to be located in the old Communist Party Central Com-
mittee headquarters. My first reaction on being told this tidbit
was one of ironic amusement: how the world has changed, I told
myself; how utterly bankrupt was communism, the party and
central planning when the Central Committee's offices could be
converted into a stock exchange. But is ironic amusement the
right response? Is there not something that is at least disturbing
about the state creating and installing the sole national securi-
ties exchange in a building that used to house a central appara-
tus of state planning? Does Eastern Europe expect that the mar-
ket's fruits can be planned for, and obtained, in a highly
regulated environment?
The history of economic reform in Eastern Europe prior to
the crumbling of the iron curtain does not, taken alone, give one
much confidence in the future. Attempts at internal reform over
the last twenty years of communist rule produced little. Bureau-
crats sabotaged reforms under the old regimes, and state enter-
prise managers were uncomfortable with change. They were used
to being told what to produce and for whom, and found it unset-
tling to have to make decisions for themselves. After twenty
years of market oriented reform under the old regime in Hun-
gary, perhaps the most capitalistic of Eastern European nations,
two-thirds of the work force was still employed by the state and
more than seventy-five percent of the country's assets were still
owned by state.
These are not hopeful indicators.
It should not be surprising that at least some key individu-
als in Eastern Europe approach their world like this - central
planning for free markets. In some European countries leaders
and managers are, at least in some part, drawn from those who
[Vol. XVII:2
PLANNING FOR SPONTANEITY
are experienced in state planning by virtue of their whole work-
ing lives. They are the insiders. Before the iron curtain collapsed
they were employed by the state as technicians and high level
bureaucrats, and have led relatively comfortable lives. They
were at least nominal Communists in many cases, and they
know where the files are kept, what information is trustworthy,
and how to get things done inside the ministries and the state
enterprises. The new governments of Eastern Europe, and the
enterprises to be privatized, cannot function wholly without
them at least for now.
I do not mean to suggest that Eastern Europeans are neces-
sarily captives of their past. Numerous courageous men and
women contradict such a notion. The media is filled with tales of
the growth of the market economy in Eastern Europe. However,
we are all at least influenced by our past and that influence can
affect behavior.
Eastern Europe has many problems, perhaps too numerous
to list, that it must face and deal with if it is to shake off its
history, and many of these are not related - at least directly -
to markets or securities. There are ethnic rivalries: in Czechoslo-
vakia an amalgam of Czechs and Slovaks live in sometimes un-
easy alliance. Roughly one-third of all those who think of them-
selves as Hungarians liv6 beyond Hungary's borders, as both
Hungary and its neighbors are acutely aware. Yugoslavia is a
country built from ethnic diversity. There are also basic eco-
nomic problems: inflation, huge foreign debts, devalued curren-
cies and declining living standards. Because the Russians are in-
sisting that oil exports to Eastern Europe be paid for in hard
currency, gasoline supplies are short. In some parts of some
countries the electricity is off one hour in four to conserve
power. The agricultural sector is weak in more than one Eastern
European country.
Though Eastern Europeans are well educated, skills rele-
vant to a free market economy are in short supply. Books of ac-
count of state enterprises are sometimes kept on a cash basis;
accrual accounting is ill understood by many. Banks sometimes
take months to clear checks, and checking accounts are not used
widely in areas. In some places individual savings are being rap-
idly diverted to consumption as prices rise, or as the long pent-
up demand for western consumer goods is released. Domestically
produced goods are frequently of poor quality, and the infra-
structure is old and worn out. Workers have, in some cases,
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grown used to leisure, to performing work shoddily, and to being
paid whether the enterprise succeeds or not. Overemployment
and unemployment are everywhere.
The goods previously sold to customers in Eastern Europe
under noncompetitive conditions now face a flood of goods from
the West that are, in many cases, of better quality, no more ex-
pensive, and more attractive. Governments seek to sell state en-
terprises to citizens who, in many cases, lack the savings to buy
them, and who if they buy them may well be disappointed at
what they've bought. At least some of those citizens with the
money to invest in local businesses may be investing the pro-
ceeds of prior years of corruption under Communist govern-
ments. Those whose properties were taken by the former Com-
munist governments are now making claims for their return. The
challenges of enterprise failure - bankruptcy and unemploy-
ment - need to be met. Will Eastern Europeans be willing to
see some of their fellow citizens grow rich, while others do not?
To see some enterprises fail, while others prosper?
In spite of this defeatist litany, there is reason to be hope-
ful. The early buds of the free market are everywhere. Currency
is bought and sold on the street, along with much more. Univer-
sity students sell Russian military caps and badges to tourists.
More importantly, small firms are de jure or de facto being
privatized nearly everywhere. Some of those who left Hungary
after 1956, or Czechoslovakia after 1968, or Poland after its in-
ternal stresses over the last decades are returning, bringing with
them their skills and some capital. Aid and technical advice are
pouring in. And, best of all, at least so far, there is little evidence
of a real lack of political will to press forward to at least what
Eastern Europeans view as market solutions to economic
problems.
Now, let me return to Africa. Though Africa made its way
to freedom from Western European governance, history and cir-
cumstance conspired to doom much African development and, in
some cases, political freedom as well. In Africa the statist cen-
tral-planning economic model was grafted onto what in many
cases were tribal societies by a small Europeanized African elite.
The attempt at wholesale transformation of an economy proved
disastrous, despite the extensive outside advice and help offered
by the Soviet Union and other countries.What do events that occurred in Africa thirty or forty years
ago have to do with the Eastern Europe of today? Like Africa
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then, Eastern Europe now is reacting against its past colonial
masters by embracing a new and unfamiliar ideology. For Africa
the reaction led to socialism, while in Eastern Europe it is lead-
ing to free markets, but in both cases it is a reaction. Like Africa
then, Eastern Europe now is adopting an ideology that may in
some part be inconsistent with its history and its culture.
Unfortunately, Africa's opportunity for change and progress
was squandered to such an extent that some countries have yet
to recover fully. We all hope that a far better future awaits East-
ern Europe.
Fortunately, as I have already noted, there are major differ-
ences between Africa and Eastern Europe. I believe that the
Eastern European's choice of free markets provides a far more
promising opportunity to achieve economic growth and prosper-
ity than did the choice of central planning by many African re-
gimes. I think we would be mistaken, however, if we blithely as-
sumed that all of Africa's tragedy can be attributed to the
defects of the central planning economic model.
It seems to me that the African experience also counsels
great caution to outsiders concerning the limits of their ability
to effect change in other countries. Advising a country on how to
effectuate a wholesale transformation of its economy is a task
that should be undertaken only with a great measure of
humility, regardless of one's belief in the virtues of one's own
ideas.
More importantly, Africa teaches that it is unlikely to be
appropriate to transplant mindlessly the legal and economic su-
perstructures of one country to another. These superstructures
generally have developed in response to specific cultural and ec-
onomic conditions that may not necessarily be present else-
where. In their fervor to propagate their views, outsiders often
fail to see and understand the particular conditions of host
countries that may call for different approaches.
This danger may well be even greater for the West in East-
ern Europe than it was for the central planners in Africa. At
least with the central-planning model, the appropriate level of
focus for its implementation was on the government elites who
would be making decisions for the rest of their country, and on
the planning mechanisms that would be necessary to effectuate
their decisions.
The driving force behind free markets, however, is most as-
suredly not in the government elites of a country, or in its regu-
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latory structures. Transplanting the United States securities reg-
ulatory structure to Eastern Europe will not, ipso facto,
transplant a free market in securities to Eastern Europe. The
key to the success of free markets is in the rewards that they
provide to private citizens for identifying and responding to the
needs and wants of society.
There is a real danger that advice to Eastern Europe on the
legal superstructures needed to control free markets, will be
used to strengthen an already existing tendency of many East-
ern European elites to maintain economic control and stifle indi-
vidual initiative. Eastern Europeans may, in short, place the
"cart" of law and regulation before the "horse" of private initia-
tive. I hope not.
The issue for Eastern Europe is not whether it can escape
intellectually from socialism - Eastern Europe has, so far, re-
jected that intellectual heritage. The real issue is whether it is
prepared to cast off the practical fetters of state central planning
and the subtle, deep seated mind-set it can engender. Ultimately
one cannot plan what is spontaneous and capitalism, at its fre-
quently unrealized best, is spontaneous above all else. To re-
strain capitalism's spontaneity too strenuously is to risk loosing
its very virtues, though we all know how those virtues sometimes
need restraint.
The impulse that the United States and other Western gov-
ernments have to help in Eastern Europe is a genuine and admi-
rable one. It is born out of relief at the end of the cold war; out
of a belief that the market does make sense; out of simple gener-
osity; out of a sense of ethnic and religious identity; and out of a
conviction that we can change the world for the better.
But we must also realize that we cannot make choices for
Eastern Europe; those nations must do what makes sense for
them, given their history and given their special set of realities.
They must, in the end, find their own way, and if that isn't the
free market as we idealize it, it may at least be something like a
free market or, at the very least, more like the free market than
what they've endured for half a century.
In the long run, whether Eastern Europe adopts a particular
structure of securities laws isn't terribly important. What mat-
ters more is whether their economies begin to show signs of real
life which, as I have said, I believe cannot be forced from the
top.
There are grave risks involved in weak economies and the
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heavy hand of over-regulation that cannot be ignored. If Eastern
Europe fails to overcome at least part of its culture and recent
history, the result may be neither freedom nor markets. As the
Economist has written:
If the economics of reform goes wrong, that will be a tragedy in
its own right. It would not be the end [of the tragedy], how-
ever, because the politics would then surely turn sour as well.
It is almost impossible to imagine the people of Eastern Eu-
rope either choosing or being forced to return to Communism,
such is their anger and disenchantment with the system they
are abandoning. But there [are] . . . other choice[s] besides
liberal democracy combined with market economics, and [they
are] hardly more attractive than communism. A failed attempt
[at] market economics could ... prepare the way for ... au-
thoritarian governments ....
I urgently hope that assessment proves to be far too gloomy.
If it does prove too pessimistic, I would suggest that Eastern
Europeans have learned successfully how to understand and deal
with their past as well as their future.
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